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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The cornerstone of the Clinton administration's welfare reform agenda
is a large expansion of the earned income tax credit (EITC), a refundable
tax credit directed primarily toward low-income taxpayers with children.
This paper reviews existing studies and provides new evidence on the
degree to which policies, like the EITC, that alter after-tax wages affect
hours of work, labor market participation, and transfer program partici-
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pation. Simulations based on recent labor supply estimates suggest that
the overall effect of the EITC expansion on hours of work from those in
the labor market will be negative but fairly small. We then examine the
effect of the EITC on labor market participation. We use a detailed SIPP-
based microsimulation model of the tax and transfer system to accurately
characterize families' budget constraints. Our empirical model relates
labor market and program participation decisions to budget constraint
variables and other characteristics. We find that the positive effect of the
EITC on labor market participation offsets and, depending on the hours
and weeks worked by new labor market participants, can exceed the
negative effect of the EITC on hours worked by those already in the
labor force. We also show that transfer program participation is nega-
tively correlated with after-tax wages, which should, over time, lower
the cost of the EITC.
1. INTRODUCTION
The cornerstone of the Clinton administration's welfare reform agenda
is a large expansion of the earned income tax credit (EITC), a refundable
tax credit directed primarily toward low-income taxpayers with children.
In fiscal year 1998 the EITC is expected to cost the federal government
$24.5 billion, $7 billion of which will result from expansions incorporated
in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA93). In contrast,
the federal share of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program is expected to be $16 billion in 1998. Even though the
EITC has been in the tax code since 1975 and now takes a central role in
the nation's antipoverty policy, relatively little has been written about it.
Like the federal government, many states also have embarked on
ambitious plans to reform welfare. From January 1, 1992, to June 14,
1994, 20 states received waivers from the Department of Health and
Human Services to alter aspects of the AFDC program (Wiseman, 1993,
1994). Although the range of experiments is very broad, one of the most
popular changes, adopted by California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Michigan, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin, reduces the rate at
which recipients lose AFDC benefits as they earn income.
The EITC and many of the state welfare waivers are part of a "make
work pay" strategy of welfare reform. These policies attempt to reduce
families' reliance on AFDC and other transfers by increasing the after-tax
return to work, which in turn is expected to increase labor market partici-
pation and hours of work. The effectiveness of these policies depends,
in part, on the degree to which people respond to change in incentives.
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degree to which after-tax wages and other factors affect labor market
participation, hours of work, and transfer program participation.
Many papers have been written on various aspects of these issues. In
the following section, we survey portions of the literature, paying spe-
cial attention to the studies' implications for the OBRA93 EITC expan-
sions. Estimates from the literature imply that the 1993 EITC expansion
will reduce hours of work by taxpayers already in the labor force because
most EITC recipients have incomes in the phaseout range of the credit,
where additional earnings reduce credit payments. Nevertheless, most
labor supply estimates imply that the elasticity of hours of work with
respect to the after-tax wage is small for both men and women, so the
overall effect of the EITC expansion on hours is expected to be fairly
small.
Less attention has been paid in the labor supply literature to the effects
of wage rates, taxes, and transfers on labor market participation, particu-
larly for women. Heckman (1993), for example, notes the lack of attention
paid to participation decisions in the literature and then writes, "Participa-
tion (or employment) decisions generally manifest greater responsive-
ness to wage and income variation than do hours-of-work equations for
workers." The participation margin is particularly important for the EITC,
because the structure of the credit ensures that it will have its most benefi-
cial labor market effects through participation. Consequently, we concen-
trate on participation rates in our empirical analysis. Because studies have
also found that transfer programs affect the behavior of single-parent
families differently than their two-parent counterparts, we also focus on
differences between family types.
We examine the determinants of labor market and transfer program
participation by first carefully modeling the budget constraints that fami-
lies face. State income tax and AFDC rules vary across states, and all
transfer programs have asset tests, income restrictions, rules on house-
hold composition, and complex interactions with other programs. These
features, together with the intricacies of the federal income tax, make
modeling these programs and their interactions a major undertaking.
We develop a detailed microsimulation model, described in Section 3,
that uses monthly data for the 1990 calendar year drawn from the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to calculate benefits and
taxes. The model is coded in the computer language C, runs on a per-
sonal computer, and contains detailed modules for SSI, AFDC, food
stamps, the federal income tax, state income taxes, and payroll taxes.
The current version of the model contains more than 10,000 lines of
executable code, fully reflects tax and program interactions, and pro-
vides accurate estimates of program benefits and taxes. Section 3 also4Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
describes the policy variables (wage rates, taxes, and transfers) and out-
come variables (transfer program participation, labor market participa-
tion, and hours) that are the focus of our research.
In Section 4 we describe a simple empirical model of labor market and
program participation based on work by Moffitt and Wolfe (1992). The
empirical model relates participation decisions to budget constraint vari-
ables and other characteristics. Estimates from the model suggest that
wage rates are positively correlated and benefit guarantees are negatively
correlated with labor market participation. In Section 5 we use our esti-
mates to simulate the effect of the EITC on labor supply across family
types. Our results imply that the OBRA93 EITC changes will increase the
labor force participation of single-parent families in our sample by 3.3
percentage points, evaluated at the mean characteristics of the sample.
The response of other family types is smaller. We find that the positive
effect of the EITC on labor market participation offsets and, depending on
the hours and weeks worked by new labor market participants, can ex-
ceed the negative effect of the EITC on hours worked by those already in
the labor force. We also show that transfer program participation is nega-
tively correlated with after-tax wages, which should, over time, lower the
cost of the EITC.
2. THE LABOR SUPPLY LITERATURE AND THE EITC
The EITC is a credit on the federal income tax available to working poor
families with children. Unlike most credits and deductions in the federal
individual income tax system, the EITC is refundablethat is, if the
amount of the credit exceeds what the taxpayer owes, he or she receives
a payment from the U.S. Treasury for the difference.1
The EITC schedule can be divided into three ranges. In the subsidy
range, the amount of the credit increases with every dollar of earned
income. In 1994, for example, the credit equals 26.3 percent of earned
income (wages, salaries, self-employment income, and farm income) for
taxpayers with one child, up to an earned income of $7,750; hence, their
maximum benefit is $2,038 (26.3 percent of $7,750). In the flat range
which, in 1994, is between $7,751 and $11,000 for taxpayers with one
childtaxpayers receive the maximum credit. In the phaseout range,
EITC benefits are reduced with every dollar of earned income. In 1994,
1Scholz (1994) discusses the EITC and shows that the participation ratethe percentage
of eligible taxpayers who actually receive the creditwas 80 to 86 percent in 1990.
Holtzblatt, McCubbin, and Gillette (1994) discuss the labor market incentives of the EITC.
Alstott (1995) discusses the design of and policy checks surrounding the EITC in the
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taxpayers with one child and incomesexceeding $11,000 have their
$2,038 credit reduced by 15.98 cents for every dollar of incomeuntil the
credit is eliminated at an income of$23,760.2 For the first time, the EITC
is also available to childless taxpayers in 1994,though the maximum
credit ($306, or 7.65 percent of $4,000) is considerablysmaller than that
available to other taxpayers.
The EITC, which was adopted in 1975, was originallypromoted as a
way to relieve the burden of thesocial security payroll tax on low-wage
working parents.3 The credit has grown dramatically inthe last 20
years. The original EITC equaled 10percent of earnings up to a maxi-
mum credit of $400 for taxpayerswith children and was phased out at a
rate of 10 cents per dollar of earnings (oradjusted gross income, which-
ever was higher) for incomes between$4,000 and $8,000. In 1996 when
the OBRA93 changes are fully phased in, the credit ratewill be 40
percent of earnings for families with two or morechildren and 34
percent for families with one child. The maximumcredit (in 1994 dol-
lars) for taxpayers with two or more children will be $3,370;for taxpay-
ers with one child, $2,040; and for taxpayerswith no children, $306.
Table 1 summarizes EITC parameters for several years discussed inthis
paper.
The EITC has different labor supply incentives depending onthe tax-
payer's income relative to the subsidy, flat, or phaseout rangeof the
credit. For taxpayers with no earned income, the substitutioneffect asso-
ciated with higher wages will provide an unambiguousincentive to
enter the labor market.4 For taxpayerswith incomes in the subsidy
range, the substitution effectprovides an incentive to increase hours of
work, whereas the income effect provides an incentive todecrease hours
of work. The net effect is ambiguous. There is only an incomeeffect in
2Taxpayers with two or more children in 1994 are entitled to alarger credit ($2,528, or 30.0
percent of income up to $8,425). This credit is phased out at a20.22-percent rate for
taxpayers with incomes between $11,000 and $26,000.
The credit also has been defended as an income security programfor low-income fami-
lies, a work incentive for welfare recipients, a subsidy to takeinto account the child care
and health care needs of children in low-income families, and anefficient mechanism for
offsetting the effects of regressive federal tax proposals. See Yin etal. (1994) for further
discussion of the credit.
Price changes can be decomposed into two effects. A wagesubsidy increases the return
to labor, making leisure more expensive. The substitutioneffect suggests that as leisure
becomes more costly, people take less (work more) holdingutility constant. The income
effect suggests that with a higher wage rate, people have more incomefor given hours of
work. With higher income, people buy more of everything theylike, including leisure,
which implies they will work less. For people just entering the labormarket, there is no
income effect. Hence, the EITC, by offering a higher wage,provides an unambiguous
incentive to enter the labor market.6Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
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Credit rate Beginning Ending Maximumrate Income
(percent)incomeincomecredit(percent)cutoff
$6,800$10,750 $953 10.00$20,264
7,750 12,2001,434 13.21 23,050
7,750 12,2001,511 13.93 23,050
7,75012,200 388 3.5723,050
7,75012,200 465 4.28523,050
Act of 1993 (OBRA93)
7,75011,0002,038 15.98 23,760
8,425 11,0002,528 17.68 25,300
4,000 5,000 306 7.65 9,000
6,00011,0002,040 15.98 23,760
8,42511,0003,370 21.06 27,000
4,000 5,000 306 7.65 9,000
Phaseout region
Source: Figures for the August 1993 budget agreement (OBRA93) were kindly provided byJanet
Holtzblatt at the Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of Treasury. The other figuresare from U.S.
Congress (1993).
Note: Figures for 1994 and beyond are in 1994 dollars.
'The young child (Or "wee tots") credit was for taxpayers who had a child under theage of one in the
tax year and incomes in the ranges designated in the table.
The supplemental health insurance credit goes to taxpayers with incomes in theranges designated in
the table who paid health insurance premiums that included coverage forone or more qualifying
children. The taxpayer cannot take advantage of the supplemental health insurance crediton expenses
used for the medical expense deduction or health insurance deduction for the self-employed (andvice
versa).
'The taxpayer must be between the ages of 25 and 65.
the flat range of the credit, which provides an incentiveto decrease
hours of work. In the phaseout range, the substitution and income ef-
fects work in the same direction and both providean incentive to de-
crease hours of work.
The labor market effects of the credit dependon the distribution of
taxpayers within the credit's ranges and the degree to which people in
and out of the labor market respond to incentives. Scholz (1994) esti-The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs7
mates that in 1996, 77 percent of EITC recipientswill have incomes that
fall in the flat or phaseout range of the credit, which raises the concern
that the EITC may lead to a net reduction in the labor suppliedby low-
income workers. The large literature on the determinantsof hours of
work yields labor supply elasticities that enable us to estimatethe
effects of the EITC on hours of work. We discuss theliterature
conventional labor supply models, models that incorporate kinkedbud-
get constraints, evidence from the income maintenanceexperiments,
and other studies of transfer programsin the followingsubsections.
Fewer papers provide guidance for thinking about theeffects of the
EITC on labor market participation. Consequently, the primaryfocus of
our empirical work is on the determinantsof labor market and transfer
program participation.
2.1 Empirical Models of Men's and Women's Hoursof Work
A common empirical model of labor supply (see Pencavel,1986, p. 52) is
H1 = a0 + a1W1 + a2Y1 + a3A1 + ., (1)
where H1 is the hours of work, W. is the market after-tax wagerate, Y1 is
nonlabor income, A1 is a vector of exogenous householdcharacteristics,
as's are parameters to be estimated, and e, is anormally distributed error
term. This specification, along with theassumption that a worker with a
specific set of characteristics faces a horizontal demand curvefor his or
her services, is sufficient to identify a labor supplyfunction consistent
with utility maximizing behavior. Because U.S. labor forceparticipation
rates for prime-age males are very high,5 and,hence, wages and hours
for virtually all prime-age males are observed, Equation(1) can be esti-
mated to study the labor supply of men directly.
Models similar to equation (1) are also a common specificationof
female labor supply. Although women's labor forceparticipation rates
have risen sharply over the last 100 years, labor forceparticipation rates
for women are still not nearly as high as they are formen.6 For familiar
reasons of sample selection, estimatingequation (1) with a sample of
working women can lead to biased estimates of all the parametersof
interest. Consequently, empirical models offemale labor supply fre-
quently adopt a two-stage estimation approach (Heckman,1976, 1979).
In data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation(described below), 93.0
percent of males age 25 to 64 work.
6The labor force participation rate for women age 25 to 64 is 59.3 percent in ourdata from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation.8Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
In the first stage, parameters governing the decision to workor not to
work are estimated, generally through probit regression. In the second
stage, an equation similar to equation (1) is estimated, augmented witha
term reflecting the conditional mean of(and often using instrumental
variables for the wage rate).
Labor supply models derived from equation (1) have considerable
appeal.7 Models for both men and women are easily estimated using
common statistical software, the linear labor supply equation results
from a somewhat unusual but nevertheless well-defined utility func-
tion,8 and the parameter estimates are easily interpretedas income and
substitution effects (see footnote 4). Specifically, the income effect is
equal to Ha2, while the substitution effect isa1Ha2.
Estimated elasticities from equation (1) for the labor supply ofmen
show a fairly consistent pattern. Pencavel (1986)surveys a number of
studies of male labor supply up to 1982; he reports that estimates of the
elasticity of hours worked with respect to wages (derived from a1) cluster
between 0.17 and 0.08. Estimates of the income effect, again in elas-
ticity form, range from 0.63 to 0.08. In only 7 of the 12 studies, how-
ever, is the substitution effect positive as the conventional labor supply
model suggests it should be, which leads Pencavel to question theem-
pirical relevance of the conventional model.
Estimated elasticities of the labor supply of womenare considerably
more varied than those for men Killingsworth and Heckman (1986,p.
179) write, "There has been a consensus of relatively long standing that
compensated and uncompensated female labor supplywage elasticities
are positive and larger in absolute value than those of men." They then
summarize 31 studies with 93 sets of estimates, where uncompensated
wage elasticities of annual hours (a1 in elasticity form) range from 0.3
to more than 14.0. Estimates of the income effect appear to bemore
precisely estimated than the uncompensated wage elasticities andrange
(with a few exceptions) from 0.02 to 0.48. The view that women's
labor force behavior differs significantly from that ofmen has shifted
A number of complications that arise with empirical implementation of this modelare
described below. We do not discuss dynamic models of labor supply (MaCurdy, 1981;
Blundell and Walker, 1986) or household bargaining models of family labor supply (McEl-
roy, 1990).
S The utility function consistent with equation (1) is
/ a2H-a1\ I U(X,H;A,)- I 2J exp
a2/ a2H-a1
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over the last 10 years, however, drivenin part by an influential paper by
Mroz (1987). In that study, Mroz presents a detailed sensitivityanalysis
of the economic and statistical assumptions used toestimate the con-
ventional model of female labor supply. Unlike muchof the previous
literature, Mroz's paper finds in his most reliablespecifications that the
compensated and uncompensated wage elasticities of womenworkers
are similar to those of men.
Studies based on equation (1) are poorly suited for estimatingthe
labor supply effects of the EITC. For taxpayers in thesubsidy range of
the credit, the coefficient on wages, a1, can be used to assessthe effects
of the credit as long as nonlinearities caused bythe tax and transfer
system are ignored. The EITC's effect onlabor supply fOr households in
the flat range of the credit, however, cannot be determinedfrom a2 in
equation (1), because Y in the canonical model is exogenousnonlabor
income (such as dividends and other capital income),while the EITC
depends on labor market choices. A similar problem arisesin the phase-
out range of the credit, where the EITCwill reduce net wages by 15.98
percent for taxpayers with one child and 21.06 percentfor taxpayers with
two or more children in 1996. Thegeneral problem arises because the
standard model of labor supply treats the tax system asbeing propor-
tional, while the EITC creates nonlinearities in the budgetconstraint.
Nonlinearities that arise from the tax and transfer system aread-
dressed in an alternative approach to the labor supplyproblem, popular-
ized by Hausman (1981). Each (linear) segment of thekinked budget
constraint faced by taxpayers can be fully characterizedby two parame-
ters: the slope (the after-tax wage rate)and the intercept (the "virtual
income").9 Optimal hours are found for each linearized segmentof the
budget constraint (replacing Y in equation [1} withvirtual income), with
hours being determined by the segment or kink pointthat yields the
highest utility (see Hausman, 1981, or Moffitt, 1986,1990 for details).
Applying the kinked budget set approach to thelabor supply prob-
lem, Hausman (1981) estimated an uncompensated wageelasticity for
males that was close to zero. However, he alsoestimated a large nega-
tive income elasticity. Because each segment ofthe nonlinear budget
constraint is characterized by a virtual income termthat generally ex-
ceeds zero, Hausman's results implied that progressiveincome taxation
in the United States generates large reductions inmale labor supply
and large efficiency losses. Hausman's work wasthe first to incorporate
Virtual income is the income a household would have if the givenlinear segment of the
budget constraint were extended to the vertical axis at zero hoursof work in the typical
leisure-consumption diagram.10Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
rigorously the effects of the tax system in the empirical model,which
raised the possibility that the small behavioral effects foundin the
earlier literature resulted from ignoring nonlinearities causedby the tax
system.
This possibility is examined by MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch(1990)
and Triest (1990), who estimate kinked budget set modelsof labor sup-
ply.1° Both studies conclude that the hours decisions ofprime-aged mar-
ried men are relatively invariant to netwages and virtual incomes. Triest
finds that the hours decisions of marriedwomen are only slightly more
sensitive to changes in taxation than are the hours decisions ofmen, but
he raises the possibility that their participation decisionsmay be quite
sensitive to changes in the net wage.
Estimates from kinked budget set studies providea natural way to
discuss the EITC's effects on hours of work, given thenonlinearities
caused by the credit. To simulate the effects of the OBRA93EITC expan-
sion, we use labor supply parameters from the kinked budgetconstraint
literature and data from the 1990 Survey of Income and ProgramPartici-
pation. Specifically, we simulate the EITC that each family inour sample
would receive in 1993 and in 1996. We then calculate thepercentage
change in real net wages (assuming that all tax ratesstay the same except
for the EITC rate) and estimate the change in virtual incomefor each
family.1' We then apply representative estimates of thewage and in-
come elasticities from the kinked budget set literature to simulate the
effect on hours worked.
The first three columns of Table 2 summarize the implicationsof the
kinked budget set literature for the OBRA93 EITCexpansions in 1996,
relative to the law that was in effect in 1993. Weuse elasticities estimated
by Triest (1990) as the central parameters. Triest findsuncompensated
wage elasticities of around 0.05 for men and 0.25 for women, and his
estimates of the virtual income elasticityare 0.0 for men and 0.15 for
women. These parameters imply that the EITC increases hours of work
by 3.9 percent in the credit's subsidyrange and imply a modest negative
effect on labor supply for taxpayers in the phaseoutrange of the credit.
Given that EITC recipients are disproportionately in the phaseoutrange
of the credit and these households workmore than other EITC recipi-
10 MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) and MaCurdy(1992) show that the kinked budget
set approach requires that the substitution effect, a1- Ha2, be nonnegative for all interior
kink points on all individuals' budget constraints. In practice, theyargue that this require-
ment rules out the possibility that labor supply is backward-bending.
11 For secondary wageearners, the changes in net wages and virtual incomes that arise
from the EITC are calculated if one assumes the hours of theprimary earner fixed at their
observed value.The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs11
TABLE 2.
Simulated Labor Supply Responses to Changes inEITC Law from
1993 to 1996
Estimated percent change in annual hours worked
Kinked budget set Simulations using NIT
simulationsi parametersc
MaCurdy Johnson andMeanRobins and
et al.Triest HausmanPencavelParameters West
Note: The estimates given for the kinked budget set simulations aremedian percentage changes. Medi-
ans are presented instead of means because asmall number of very low-income single parents in the
subsidy range have extremely high marginal tax rates and,therefore, extremely large simulated wage
effects.
The median monthly hours for the sample is 160. If onereads down the rows of the table, median
monthly hours are 80 (for the subsidy range), 148, 160, 180,140, 160, 160, 180, and 160.
The wage and virtual income elasticities for the kinkedbudget set simulations are as reported in Triest
(1994). The elasticities from Triest (1990) are presented asthe central estimates; MaCurdy, Green, and
Paarsch (1990), the low estimates; and Hausman (1981),the high estimates.
Parameters from the NIT studies are as reported in GAO(1993). The estimates from Johnson and
Pencavel (1984) imply the least negative labor supply.The parameters from Robins and West (1983)
imply the largest negative effects. These parameters alongwith the arithmetic mean have been adjusted
to 1994 dollars.
ents, the overall effect of the EITC onthe labor supply of working recipi-
ents, based on Triest's estimates, isnegative, but small (-0.54 percent).
Triest's estimated elasticities imply that theEITC will affect the hours
worked by men and women differently. Men arerelatively unresponsive
to the EITC's incentives to alterhours. Only the small wage effect is
important, since the estimated incomeeffect is zero. Consequently,
Triest's parameters imply that men will reducetheir hours by only 0.34
percent due to the EITC expansion.For women in the subsidy range of
All recipients -0.09-0.54-4.04-1.16 -1.17 -1.63
By credit range
Subsidy 1.88 3.9213.46 6.88 2.44 2.25
Flat -0.09-0.19-1.79-0.60 -1.08 -1.64
Phaseout -0.53-1.11-4.73 -1.46 -1.50 -1.63
By marital status
Husbands 0.00-0.34-3.17-1.44 -1.32 -1.47








Male 0.00-0.34-3.15-1.44 -1.32 -1.47
Female -0.57-1.17-4.33-0.93 -1.08 -1.6312Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
the credit, the wage elasticity of 0.25 impliesa larger positive effect of the
EITC on hours than his estimate formen. In all three ranges of credit,
women will reduce hours of work due to the negative virtualincome
effect of 0.15, and women in the phaseoutrange will further reduce
hours due to the positive uncompensatedwage elasticity. The specific
amount of the reduction in hours dependson the size of the maximum
EITC relative to virtual income in the absenceof the EITC. Overall, the
Triest parameters imply that the EITC willreduce the labor supplied by
women workers by 1.2 percent.12 Estimates of MaCurdy, Green,and
Paarsch (1990) imply slightly lowerresponses of both men and women
to increases in the EITC, while the estimates of Hausman(1981), imply
much higher effects relative to those using theTriest parameters, particu-
larly for women and taxpayers in the subsidyrange of the credit.
Like the older literature on labor supply, thekinked budget set papers
provide little guidance for theway the EITC might affect labor force
participation, though the aggregate effect of the EITCon labor supply
will depend, in part, on the credit's effecton labor market participation.
In addition, the observedresponses to taxes, benefits, and wages by
low-income households may differ from those ofother households in
ways not reflected by the common empirical specifications. Forexample,
the transfer system sharply alters the budgetconstraints faced by low-
income households. Papers in the labor supplyliterature typically either
ignore or incorporate only simplifiedrepresentations of the transfer sys-
tem in their analyses.
2.2 Income Maintenance Experiments
Between 1968 and 1982, the United Statessponsored two rural income
maintenance experiments in North Carolina andIowa, and two urban
income maintenance experiments,one in Gary, Indiana, and one split
between Seattle, Washington, and Denver, Colorado.Robins (1985) re-
ports that $225 million (in 1984 dollars)was spent on these experiments,
of which $63 million represented directpayments to families. The main
purpose of these experiments was to measure the work effort andearn-
ings effects of higher transfers, includinga negative income tax (NIT),
on the low-income population. Pencavel (1986)surveys NIT labor sup-
ply estimates for men, and Robins (1985) does thesame for all family
types.
Hoffman and Seidman (1990, Chap. 3) and theU.S. General Account-
12Triest (1994) simulates the welfare effects of several policiesthat would increase the
progressivity of the U.S. individual income tax using estimated laborsupply elasticities
from the literature. He concludes that expanding the EITCis a particularly efficient way of
increasing progressivity.The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs13
ing Office (1993, Chap. 3) simulate the effectsof the EITC on hours of
work, using behavioral parameters estimated fromstudies of the income
maintenance experiments. These studies' results aredifficult to compare
with our simulations based on the kinked budget setliterature because
the underlying data differ and because the OBRA93EITC expansion is
more generous than the policiesexamined by Hoffman and Seidman
and the GAO. Therefore, we extend the GAOsimulations using data
from the 1990 SIPP to examine the OBRA93 EI]Cexpansion. Following
the GAO's approach, we apply estimates of the wageeffects on hours
from the NIT experiments to the changes in EITCsubsidy and clawback
rates, and estimates of the income effects onhours to the change in the
level of the EITC between 1993 and 1996. We use anarithmetic mean of
estimates from several NIT studies for the centralbehavioral parameters.
For comparison, we also use estimates fromJohnson and Pencavel
(1984), since those imply the least negativelabor supply effects, and
estimates from Robins and West (1983), sincethose imply the largest
negative labor supply effects.
The results are summarized in the last three columnsof Table 2. The
labor supply responses implied by the NIT aresomewhat larger than
those implied by the low and medium kinkedbudget set estimates (the
first two columns of Table 2). The discrepancybetween the two sets of
estimates primarily arises from differences inthe underlying behavioral
parameters for female heads of households.The NIT experiments al-
lowed wage and income elasticities for female familyheads to be esti-
mated separately from the elasticities for other women.In the kinked
budget set simulations, we used elasticitiesfor women that mix what
appear to be disparate labor market responsesof married and unmarried
women. Though the estimatesdiffer between the two sets of elasticity
estimates, the labor market simulationsshow that the large change in
the EITC between 1993 and 1996 is expected tohave a fairly small nega-
tive overall effect on the hours worked byEITC recipients, under all but
the Hausman (1981) parameter estimates.
Like the rest of the literature, the NIT experimentsprovide little evi-
dence about the likely effects of the EITC onlabor market participation.
In addition, an important qualification toboth sets of labor market simu-
lations is that we assume that workers perceivethe EITC as an increase
in their after-tax wage. The design of theincome maintenance experi-
ments made clear the links between transferpayments, earned income,
and the benefit reduction rate. In contrast, 99.5 percentof EITC recipi-
ents receive the credit in a lump sumafter filing a tax return (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1992), 50 the links betweenearnings, bene-
fits, and the phaseout may be less clear to recipients.To the extent that14Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
workers do not associate the EITC with higher net-of-taxwages, our
simulations presumably overstate the effects of the crediton hours.13
2.3 Microeconometric Studies of Transfer Programs
Several papers estimate structural models of the effects ofincome trans-
fers on the labor market behavior of female-headedhouseholds with
children. 14 Blank (1985) estimatesa labor supply model, similar to equa-
tion (1), jointly with a welfare participation model toexamine how cross-
state variation in wages, welfare benefits, demographic characteristics,
and taxes affects labor market behavior. AFDCparticipants are given a
state-specific implicit tax rate, which, aswe discuss below, masks varia-
tion in taxes within a state that dependson family size and structure,
unearned income, and "disregards."15 Tax rates fornonparticipants in-
clude federal and state income taxes and payrolltaxes. Blank finds that
wages are positively correlated with hours of work and that other in-
come and welfare benefits are negatively correlated with hours, but the
economic effects of these variables are relatively small for hersample.16
She emphasizes that factors other than income andtaxes are very impor-
tant in influencing welfare decisions.
Fraker and Moffitt (1988) examine the effects of foodstamps and AFDC
on the labor supply of female-headed households with children. Their
empirical approach models AFDC participation, foodstamp participa-
tion, and a discrete hours decision (0, 20, and 40 hours)and addresses a
number ofcomplications that arise in the empirical laborsupply litera-
ture. Wages for women not in the labor forceare calculated in a manner
consistent with Heckman and MaCurdy (1981).17 Wagesare also allowed
Because almost all recipients receive the EITC as a lump-sumpayment, we simulated the
effects of the 1993 expansion on hours worked if recipients perceive onlyincome effects.
Using the parameters from Triest (1990), we find that the overall medianchange in hours is
0.13 percent, which is clearly smaller than the combinedwage and income effects de-
scribed above.
14Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981) providea detailed, wide-ranging discussion of
the research on income transfer programson labor supply and saving up to 1981. Moffitt
(1992) provides a more recent comprehensive survey of the incentiveeffects of transfer
programs.
Disregards are deductions from earnings used to calculate transferprogram benefits.
These deductions generally apply to child careexpenses, work expenses, and, in some
cases, general expenses.
16For example, a $1 increase in wages in her sample (themean wage was $2.91 an hour)
would increase hours by one per week.
17Potential wages of those who do not work are not observed. Often,wage rates for
nonworkers are imputed from auxiliary wage rate regressions, and actualwage rates are
used for workers (Triest, 1990; Moffitt and Wolfe, 1992). This isappropriate only if theThe Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs15
to increase with hours of work,and a "stigma" term is included in the
model so not all families eligible for benefitsactually receive them
(Moffitt, 1983). Fraker and Moffitt find nodetectable effects of benefit
reduction rates on program participation. Theirestimated uncompen-
sated wage elasticities vary from 0.26 to 0.35,and their income elasticities
vary from 0.07 to 0.11. The wageand income elasticities are compara-
ble with those reported in the earlier literature. Thestudy by Fraker and
Moffitt is one of only a few that examines theeffect of net wages on pro-
gram participation. They findthat the difference in net income at 20 hours
of work and at zero hours of work has astatistically significant positive
effect on the labor market participation of femaleheads of households.
Keane and Moffitt (1991) consider the effectsof the tax rates imposed
by AFDC, food stamps, and housing programs onthe hours and partici-
pation decisions of female heads of householdsusing simulation estima-
tion methods. Along with addressing the complicationsraised by Fraker
and Moffitt (1988), they account for theexpected value of Medicaid
benefits and the expected value of private health insurancein the budget
constraint using calculations from Moffitt andWolfe (1992). 18 Keane and
Moffitt estimate an uncompensated wage elasticitywith respect to hours
of 0.66 and a total income elasticity with respectto hours of 0.24 for
single-parent households using data from the1984 Survey of Income
and Program Participation. Thus, relative tothe literature described
above, their results suggest that the EITCwould have considerably
larger positive effects on hours in the credit'ssubsidy range and larger
negative effects on hours in its phaseout range.
When Keane and Moffitt simulate the labormarket effect of raising the
gross wage rate by $1, theyfind that hours increase by only 38 percent of
what their estimates of the uncompensated wageelasticity of hours
imply. This occurs for two primary reasons. First, achange in the gross
wage has only a smalleffect on the net-of-tax wage because they calcu-
late that low-income women faceextremely high cumulative marginal
tax rates, often exceeding 100 percent.Even reducing the AFDC tax rate
to 50 percent from 100 percent leavescumulative tax rates of 60 to 80
wage rates of nonworkers are predictedwithout error. An alternative is to use the pre-
dicted wage for both workers and nonworkers (Blank, 1985;Hoynes, 1993). When the
estimated model is nonlinear, this is appropriate only if all familiesbase their decisions on
the econometrician's predictions instead of theiractual wage rates. Fraker and Moffitt
(1988) rigorously account for missing wages by usingthe predicted wage for nonworkers
and then integrating out over the error distribution of theunobserved wage rate.
18Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) examine the effects of AFDCand Medicaid on the welfare and
labor market participation of female heads of families. Theyfind both Medicaid and private
health insurance have substantial effects on labor marketand welfare participation.16Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
percent. They write, "Such tax rates, especially at the lowgross wage
rates faced by women participating in welfareprograms, imply very
small income gains from working." Second,many families not in the
labor force are not on the margin of working. Thisseems to indicate that
labor supply studies of low-income households that donot model the
labor force participation decision may givea misleading impression of
the effect of economic variables on labor market behavior.
Hoynes (1993) presents the only structural empirical model oftwo-
parent families in the literature on labor supply and transferprogram
participation. She restricts her sample, taken from the 1984 SIPP (but
applying to 1986), to two-parent families that in the absence oflabor
market participation would be eligible for AFDC-UP (the AFDCprogram
for intact families with an unemployed parent). Hoynes finds thattwo-
parent families are considerably more responsive to changes in AFDC-UP
program parameters than would be expected from studies of single-
parent households. For example, she estimates that eliminating AFDC-
UP would increase men's labor supply by 46.9 hours and women's labor
supply by 31.6 hours per month, while Moffitt (1983) estimates thatelimi-
nating AFDC would increase hours worked by female heads of household
by roughly four hours per week. Hoynes also finds fairly largeeffects on
program participation and hours of work from changes in benefit reduc-
tion rates, in contrast to much of the literature. She speculatesthat the
more elastic behavior may reflect behavioral differences between one- and
two-parent families, but reconciling the results is beyond thescope of her
study.
2.4 Lessons from the Literature and Empirical Questions
The literature yields consistent evidence that the laborsupply of prime-
age males is fairly insensitive to changes in wages and incomes. In the
standard literature and the income maintenance experiments,uncompen-
sated wage elastics are often estimated to be small and negative(around
0.1), while income elasticities are small and positive (around 0.15). Us-
ing the kinked budget set appraoch, Triest (1990) estimatesan income
elasticity of 0.0 and an uncompensatedwage elasticity of 0.05. As shown
in Table 2, estimates in this range imply that the EITC will have onlyminor
effects on the hours worked by prime-age males. Because thelabor force
participation rate for this group is very high, it is also clear that the EITC
will not have an important effect on labor force participation.19
19Even if taxes do not affect hours of work or participation, theymay affect other dimen-
sions of labor market behavior such as commuting distances, stresson the job, and forms
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Labor supply estimates from the literature on married womenshow
considerably more variability, but recent estimates fromthe traditional
literature (Mroz, 1987), the NIT experiments(Robins, 1985), and the
kinked budget set literature (Triest, 1990) suggest thatthe elasticities of
women's hours of work to changes in wages and incomes aresimilar to
those estimated for men. Triest's estimatesof an uncompensated wage
elasticity of 0.25 and an income elasticityof 0.15 are representative of
recent studies. These estimates imply thatsubstantial increases in the
EITC are likely to have negative, but not particularlylarge, effects on
hours worked. A sophisticated, carefulstudy by Keane and Moffitt
(1991) generates wage and income elasticities that aresomewhat larger
than those mentioned above, so additionalwork in this area could still
be valuable.
Keane and Moffitt (1991) and Giannarelli andSteuerle (1994) use a
microsimulation approach to calculate detailed tax rates onhouseholds
caused by the tax and transfer system. Their resultshave pessimistic
implications for the effect of the EITC on labor marketbehavior. Keane
and Moffitt find the tax rates faced by a representativelow-income,
female-headed family range from 75 percent (in Ohio) to 124 percent(in
California).20 Even large increases in after-tax wages,such as those
offered by the OBRA93 expansions of the EITC, arelikely to have only
modest effects on labor market participation giventhese tax rates. At
the same time, the relatively large uncompensated wageand income
elasticities they estimate imply that the EITC willhave a larger, nega-
tive effect on the hours of taxpayers that workthan suggested by much
of the literature. Thus, Keane and Moffitt's resultswould imply a fairly
substantial reduction in aggregate labor supply by thosealready in the
labor market, which would not be offset by increasesin labor market
participation.
3. TAXES, TRANSFERS, ANDLOW-INCOME
FAMILIES
The central focus of our empirical work is on thedeterminants of labor
force and transfer program participation. Onedifficulty with examining
the effects of policies that may affect participation isthat a broad range
of programs exist that, in conjunction with stateand federal tax sys-
tems, create a complex set of incentivesthat are difficult for analysts to
characterize. In much of the previous literature, forexample, research-
20The reported tax rates are calculated from changes inafter-tax and after-transfer income
associated with increasing hours of work from 0 to 20 hours,and from 20 to 40 hours.18Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
ers use uniform tax rates for all transfer program recipients ina given
state. Even within a state, however, taxes and benefitsvary depending
on sources of income, program participation, assets, demographic char-
acteristics, and income exemptions. To characterize the budgetsets
facing households, we have developeda simulation model that accu-
rately represents transfer program rules, tax systems, andtheir com-
plex interactions.
3.1 The Simulation Model and Data
Detailed modules for AFDC, food stamps, Supplemental SecurityIncome
(SSI), the federal income tax, state income taxes, and thepayroll tax are
the building blocks for the microsimulation model. All moduleshave a
common structure: Each defines the unit of analysis for tax and transfer
programs, performs income and asset tests or determines adjustedgross
income and taxable income, and determines benefitsor taxes.2'
The model uses monthly data from the 1990 SIPP for theperiod Janu-
ary to December 1990. Using SIPP allows us to make fewer imputations
than would be required if we used annual data, suchas the Current
Population Survey (CPS).23 In addition, SIPP providesa high level of
detail on sources of income, particularly for low-income households.
The main advantage of SIPP, however, is that it provides data thatallow
us to calculate program eligibility and benefits in every month. Over
time frames longer than a month, variation in income, labor forcepartici-
pation, assets, and family composition leads toan ambiguous definition
of program eligibility and participation. Thus, whenwe refer to labor
market participation, transfer program participation,or other point-in-
time concepts, we are referring to the last month inwave 3 of the 1990
SIPP panel, which was collected from September throughDecember
1990.23 State and federal taxes, whichare calculated on an annual basis,
21The simulation model is described in more detail in Dickert, Houser, andScholz (1994).
The current version of the model also incorporates dataon child care expenses from the
SIPP topical modules. These data are used in all the transferprogram modules, for federal
tax credits, and, in some cases, for state tax credits or deductions. We alsouse asset
information from the SIP? topical modules to implement asset testsassociated with trans-
fer programs. Data on alimony payments are also used toassess income eligibility in
transfer programs (through "deeming" rules) andas an adjustment to income in the
federal income tax module.
SIPP's sample includes roughly one-third asmany households as the CPS's sample.
SIP? does not separately identify all 50 states because nine smallerstates are combined into
three groups for confidentiality reasons.
There are four rotation groups in SIPP whose interviewsare staggered across months. A
"wave" is completed when each of the four groups has been interviewedonce. Each SIP?
panel generally consists of seven or eight waves.The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs19
are appropriately accounted for byadding incomes and benefits over the
calendar year.
We restrict our sample in several ways that are commonin the
literature on transfer programs. We exclude families inwhich the
head or spouse (1) is older than 65 or has a disability, (2)would not
be eligible for program benefits even if he or she did notwork, (3)
does not have children under 18, or (4) isself-employed. The first
restriction arises from our focus on labor market behavior.24The sec-
ond restriction, which primarily excludes families with assetsthat ex-
ceed program asset tests, arises from our focus on transfer program
participation. The third restriction arises from our focus on theEITC.
In 1990 a taxpayer had to support a child to be eligiblefor the EITC.25
The fourth restriction arises from the difficulty ofcalculating wage
rates for the self-employed.
The simulation model allows us to identify familieseligible for bene-
fits, which is necessary for participation rate analyses. Inthe following
subsection we use the model to describe patterns of eligibilityand partici-
pation in the food stamp and AFDC programs, focusing onthree differ-
ent groups: single-parent families, primary earners inmarried couples,
and secondary earners in married couples. The datadescribed in the
remaining parts of Section 3 are summarized in Table 3.
3.2 Program Eligibility and Participation
AFDC eligibility rules and benefits vary sharply byfamily structure and
across states. Roughly 15 percentof the individuals in the sample are
eligible for AFDC. Almost all of these are single parents, of whom 43.8
percent are eligible. Average AFDC benefits,conditional on eligibility, are
$372 per month for single-parent families and are somewhatlarger for
two-parent families. In 1990, the maximum AFDCbenefit for a three-
person household in the continental U.S.ranged from $120 in Mississippi
to $694 in California (U.S. Congress, 1990). Themodel shows similar
variation in AFDC benefits across large states, rangingfrom an average of
$115.53 per month in Mississippi to an average of$652.06 per month in
24The labor market behavior of the disabled population is clearly an interesting topicof
research (see, e.g., Haveman, de Jong, and Wolfe, 1991), but SIPP does nothave informa-
tion on the severity of the disability. Because the type of disability mayinordinately
influence labor market behavior, we have chosen to drop the disabledfrom our sample.
The second and third restrictions imply that we treat asst accumulation andfertility
decisions as exogenous to transfer programs. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes(1993) discuss
a dynamic, stochastic, life-cycle simulationmodel where the transfer system has a large
effect on asset accumulation. Moffitt (1992) surveys the literature on transfer programsand
fertility decisions.20Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
TABLE 3.
Means of Selected Sample Characteristics for Single Parents and
Primary and Secondary Earners in Two-Parent Families (standard
deviations in parentheses)
Notes: Data are from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation. Themean age is 33.7 years,
and this does not vary greatly among the types. The mean level of education is 11.67 grades,and this











% Eligible AFDC 14.87 43.80 1.74 1.85
Conditional AFDC benefit 372.26 367.88 442.00 408.58
(214.20)(206.86) (313.55) (272.25)
AFDC participation rate (%) 71.79 76.10 25.00 23.53
% Eligible food stamps 39.94 70.04 26.33 26.33
Conditional food stamp 207.64 204.12 221.58 222.09
benefit (96.64) (96.29) (110.08) (90.84)
Food stamp participation (%) 51.59 66.67 32.23 34.71
Wage ($ per hour) 7.52 6.55 8.62 7.30
(4.16) (3.19) (3.75) (4.99)
Tax rate (0 to 20 hours) 40.93 49.62 31.92 42.07
(25.57) (28.69) (24.43) (16.22)
% Working 70.10 56.44 91.62 60.94
Usual hours worked/week 27.91 20.49 39.19 23.33
(20.68) (19.66) (15.70) (21.18)
Family size 3.89 3.01 4.28 4.28
(1.30) (1.16) (1.16) (1.16)
Number of dependents 2.08 1.91 2.15 2.15
(1.11) (1.10) (1.10) (1.10)
% with children < 6 52.72 46.81 55.39 55.39
% w/ poor or fair health 10.94 17.45 7.07 8.92
% Women 63.84 94.46 26.00 73.99
% Nonwhite 27.84 44.52 20.57 20.02
% Urban 74.19 78.22 72.36 72.36
Region-East 17.57 21.30 15.89 15.89
Region-Midwest 20.91 23.10 19.91 19.91
Region-South 46.50 39.83 49.51 49.51
Region-West 15.40 15.76 15.23 15.23
Number of observations 2669 831 919 919
% of Total sample 31.14 34.43 34.43The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs21
California.26 The variation in AFDC benefits across states dwarfs the varia-
tion required to adjust for cost-of-living differences.27
Not every family eligible for program benefits actually receivesthem.
(Moffitt [1983] presents a well-known discussion of this issue.) With our
model simulations of eligibility and SIPP data on participation, we can
examine the participation ratethe fraction of eligiblefamilies that re-
port receiving program benefits. In our sample, theADFC participation
rate is 71.8 percent, and 76.1 percent for single-parentfamilies. These
rates are comparable to the 62- to 72-percent ratesreported by Blank and
Ruggles (1993) in their study of participation rates using the1986 and
1987 SIPP panels, but somewhat higher than earlierresults in the litera-
ture (Moffitt, 1983). The empirical model estimatedin Section 4 examines
factors correlated with transfer program participation.28
Uniform national rules govern food stamp eligibility and benefits. In
our sample, 39.9 percent offamilies are eligible for food stamps. By
family type, 70.0 percent of single-parent families and 26.3 percentof
two-parent families are eligible. Average food stampbenefits, condi-
tional on eligibility, are $208 per month, and there is little difference
across family types. Because of uniformnational standards, there is little
cross-state variation in food stamp benefits. The averagebenefit of
$140.62 per month in California, however, is considerably below the
sample mean of $207.64. This occurs because California's generous
AFDC system reduces the amount of food stamps a family iseligible to
receive as AFDC is included in food stamp "countable income."
Studies typically find the food stamp participation rate to be lower
than the AFDC rate. We find the participation rate in thefood stamps
program is 51.6 percent, which is higherthan an older estimate of 38
percent by MacDonald (1977) but similar to recentestimates of 54 to 66
percent by Blank and Ruggles (1993). The averageparticipation rate
masks sharp variation across family types. The participation rate is 66.7
26We define a large state as one with at least 50 observations in the sample,which includes
22 states.
27For example, cost-of-living indices reported in the New York Times (8/5/94,A.1) give
Mississippi an index value of 86.7 and California a value of 112.3; Los Angeleshad a value
of 127.9, while Dothan, Alabama, had a value of 87.4. (In both the state and urbanindices,
100 denotes an average value.) If cross-state AFDC differencessolely reflected cost-of-
living differences, maximum benefits in Mississippi would exceed $500, givenCalifornia's
benefit.
Both primary earners and secondary earners in two-parent families respond to ques-
tions about program participation and benefits, which may account forthe slight differ-
ence in reported participation and conditionalbenefits between primary and secondary
earners in Table 3. In addition, stepparents may notbe eligible for benefits in some
states.22Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
percent for single-parent families and around 33 percent for two-parent
families.
3.3 Taxes
The simulation model also allows us to calculate families' marginal and
average tax rates corresponding to actual or counterfactual situations. In
our empirical work, for example, we need a tax rate measure that is
exogenous to labor market and transfer program participation decisions.
Like Keane and Moffitt (1991), we calculate anexogenous tax rate that is
based on the change in after-tax and transfer income that would result
from increasing hours of work from 0 to 20 (or 40) hoursper week. An
inevitable problem in labor market studies, however, is thatwages are
only observed for people who work.
We follow Triest (1990) and Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) anduse predicted
wages for adults that are not in the labor market.29 Predictions are based
on log wage regressions estimated separately for men and women, drop-
ping the self-employed and adjusting for selection. Covariates include
quadratics in age and education, an interaction of age and education, the
state unemployment rate for women (in the male wage regressionswe use
the general state unemployment rate), and dummy variables for His-
panic, African-American, married, and residence in a metropolitanarea.
We use number of children and a dummy variable for thepresence of
children younger than six as exclusion restrictions in the probit regression
for being in the labor force. Like Hoynes (1993), we calculate median
wages from our empirical model because of the skewness of the wage
distribution. For both men and women, the regression estimatesare simi-
lar to other studies in the literature, and predictedwages closely match
actual wages. Descriptive statistics for the samples used to estimatewages
and the regression results for men and women are available from the
authors on request.
Taxes in the model arise from benefit reduction rates associated with
income transfer programs (often called implicit taxes) and from payroll,
state income, and federal income taxes (often called explicit taxes). When
the combined effect of the tax and transfer system is considered, it is
clear that tax burdens on low-income families can be very high.
A family receiving AFDC that has earned income is entitled toa num-
ber of disregards before AFDC benefits are reduced. A recipient with
earnings can subtract $90 per month for work expenses, as muchas $175
29See footnote 17 for a more detailed discussion of unobserved wages. In every empirical
model that we estimate, we examine the sensitivity of our results to using predictedwage
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per child per month for child care expenses, and, for the first four
months of work, $30 plus an additional one-third of remaining earnings.
For earned income exceeding these disregards, AFDC benefits are re-
duced by 66 cents for every dollar of income for the first four months of
work. After four consecutive months, the tax rate increases to 100 per-
cent after deducting work and child care expenses (and $30 for eight
additional months) 30
Food stamp recipients who have earned income are also entitled to a
number of disregards before food stamp benefits are reduced. A recipi-
ent with earnings receives a standard deduction of $127, a deduction for
dependent-care expenses up to $160, and an additional deduction of 20
percent of earned income.31 Participating households are expected to
contribute 30 percent of their income exceeding deductions toward food
purchases. Thus, the implicit marginal tax rate on income exceeding
deductions (including AFDC and SSI benefits) is 30 percent.
The layering of programs is complicated and may lead to even higher
benefit reductions than would occur when programs are examined in
isolation. The model captures these program interactions. For example, a
person receiving benefits from both AFDC and food stamps and who has
earned income exceeding the AFDC disregards would face a 66-percent
marginal tax rate on AFDC. From the perspective of the food stamps
program, earned income increases by 80 cents for every dollar of earnings
(due to the 20-percent disregard for earnings), but unearned income falls
by 66 cents for every dollar of earnings (the reduction in AFDC benefits).
The net of these amounts, 13 cents, is the increase in food stamp "count-
able income" for every dollar of earnings, and is taxed at a 30-percent rate,
which adds 4 percentage points to the AFDC marginal tax rate. Thus, the
implicit tax rate on earnings (beyond the disregards) in the first four
months of employment for a person receiving AFDC and food stamps is
7percent; after four months it is 94 percent.32
° In the calculations below, we do not account for the additional one-third earned income
deduction because we cannot assess the duration of AFDC receipt in our data. Thus, our
AFDC tax rate is akin to a "long-run" tax. Of AFDC households with earned income, 50.6
percent have the $30 plus one-third disregard, while roughly 13 percent of all AFDC
households have earned income (U.S. Congress, 1993).
31There are additional deductions for shelter expenses that exceed 50 percent of countable
income after the other deductions and for medical expenses for households that include an
elderly or disabled member. SIPP does not have data on shelter and medical expenses, so
we do not account for these deductions in the model.
32After four months of earnings, the AFDC tax rate on earnings increases to 100 percent so
AFDC benefits fall dollar for dollar. This 100-percent marginal tax is slightly offset by the
food stamps program because, although food stamp earned income still increases by 80
cents for every dollar of earnings, unearned income would have fallen by $1. Food stamp24Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
Explicit taxes also affect low-income families. We assume that the
combined 15.3-percent employee and employer shares of the payroll tax
are borne by employees. The federal income tax is modeled as precisely
as possible given available information in SIPP, except that we assume
all taxpayers use the standard deduction. Special attention is paid to
accurately modeling the EITC (see Scholz, 1994, for details). Average
effective tax rates from the model closely match data from the Internal
Revenue Service (1993), though average tax rates on low-income house-
holds in our model are somewhat lower than those shown in income tax
data. Relative to the IRS data, our low-income tax-reporting units are
more likely to be families as opposed to children working part-time jobs
and, thus, are more likely to receive the EITC, which leads to lower
average effective rates in our model.
We calculate state income taxes using tax forms collected from the 41
states (including the District of Columbia) with state income taxes in
1990. Nine states have credits for low-income filers (including state
EITC's in Iowa, Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin);
eight states have credits for the elderly and disabled. In addition, we
incorporate many other special provisions for dependents and exemp-
tions. Credits vary among states with regard to eligibility, generosity,
and whether the credits are refundable. New Mexico, for example, has a
low-income credit that uses "modified Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)."
Modified AGI includes AFDC, SSI, and food stamp benefits that are
calculated in our simulations. Average effective state income tax rates
vary in the model from 0.0 percent (several states) to 5.5 percent in the
District of Columbia and are strikingly similar to those reported in the
Bureau of the Census (1992, Tables 463 and 687).
3.3.1 Cumulative Average and Marginal Tax RatesThe layering of im-
plicit and explicit taxes can lead to high average and marginal tax rates
on low-income households. To illustrate these tax rates, we present a
series of figures showing marginal and average tax rates along several
dimensions: a median- versus high-tax family, a low- versus high-benefit
state, and single-parents versus primary earners in two-parent families.
Figure 1 shows marginal tax rates for four single-parent families in
Texas (a low-benefit state) and New York (a high-benefit state). The
families shown are the median and 90th percentile families in each state
countable income, therefore, falls by 20 cents and food stamp benefits would increase by
six cents for every dollar of earnings, leading to a cumulative tax rate of 94 percent.
Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1994) provide comparisons of the simulation model's
output with administrative sources.The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs25
when ranked according to the cumulative tax rate distribution (going
from 0 to 20 hours of work). We calculate marginal tax rates forthese
representative families from the incremental change in after-taxand
after-transfer income resulting from an increase in one hour of work at
the earner's market wage. The marginal tax rate is relevant for incremen-
tal labor supply decisions.
Each graph has several shaded bars. The dark gray bottom bar ineach
figure (at low hours of work) shows the marginal federal income tax rate
for each family. It is 14 percent at low hours because eachfamily is
eligible for the EITC subsidy, which was 14 percent in 1990 (see Table1).
The large, unshaded portion of each bar reflects the marginal tax rate
from AFDC. The marginal rate on AFDC is initially zero becauseof
disregards. As hours increase, the AFDC marginal rate is 100 percent
until benefits are fully "clawed back." The light gray bars reflect thefood
stamp marginal tax rate, which is 24 percent whenAFDC is untaxed.
When AFDC is taxed, the food stamp marginal tax rate is actually nega-
tive (see footnote 32). There is a uniform 15.3-percentpayroll tax on all
families. Low-income families in New York also pay amodest state
income tax, shown in black.
Several features are apparent in Figure 1. First, until benefits are fully
clawed back, AFDC is the primary source of high tax rates on low-
income families. Second, Figure 1 illustrates the progressionof federal
marginal tax rates for each family. The tax rate is 14 percent when
families are in the EITC subsidy range, zero when families are in the flat
part of the credit, and 10 percent in the phaseout range.The two New
York families reach the 15-percent federal tax bracket (along with the
EITC phaseout) at 38 or more hours of work. Third, Figure 1 shows the
effect of a "notch" for the median Texas family. Moving from 36 to37
hours of work, this family would lose $1.50 of food stampbenefits for
every $1 of earned income. Families eligiblefor food stamps must have
"gross" income less than 130 percent of the poverty line and must also
meet a "net" income test. Our median Texas family,while still meeting
the net income test at 37 hours, fails the gross income test and, hence,
loses all remaining benefits. Notches are common in the income transfer
system due to various asset and income tests.34 Fourth, cumulative mar-
ginal tax rates in the figures are equal to the sum of the positive and
negative rates, and they can be very high. Thus, for example, the cumula-
tive marginal tax rate for the median family in Texas working twohours
per week is 95.3 percent (the 100-percentAFDC rate + the 15.3-percent




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































xThe Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs27
FICA rate + the - 14-percent EITC rate + the 6-percent food stamp
rate).
The marginal tax rates for the four families lead to the average tax rates
shown in Figure 2. Average tax rates are defined from the change in
after-tax and after-transfer incomes when weekly hours of work increase
from zero to the number of hours shown on the horizontal axis. We view
these average tax rates as being most relevant when families are making
labor force participation decisions. The average tax figures tend to have a
concave shape that is driven by AFDC. The AFDC average tax rate
increases at low hours of work as disregards dissipate. Once disregards
are exhausted, average AFDC rates are pulled up by thehigh marginal
rates on AFDC. After benefits are fully clawed back, average AFDC rates
again fall. Because the AFDC guarantee in Texas is low, cumulative tax
rates in Texas tend to be considerably lower than in New York, particu-
larly when one is looking at the rates from 0 to 20, or 0 to 40 hours of
work, which are the relevant participation margins for most families.35
Cumulative average tax rates, which again are the sum of the positive
and negative bars, can also be extremely high. For example, the average
tax rate exceeds 85 percent for the high-tax New York family that enters
the labor market and works anywhere from 8 to 35 hours per week. This
implies that this family, when making labor market participation deci-
sions, will receive no more than 15 cents for every dollar earned in the
labor market over a broad range of hours. Tax rates like these undoubt-
edly discourage labor market participation. Average tax rates tend to be
somewhat lower in low-benefit states and are much lower for families
that do not receive transfers, particularly AFDC.
Appendix Figures 1 and 2 show similar figures for the median and 90th
percentile two-parent families in Texas and New York. Tax rates apply to
the earnings of the primary earner and assume the secondary earner is not
in the labor market. The marginal tax rate figure shows several food stamp
notches and marginal tax rates that tend to be considerably lower than
those faced by one-parent families. This occurs because very few two-
parent families are eligible for AFDC-UP in our data. The 90th percentile
two-parent family in New York received AFDC-UP and, hence, faced
marginal and average tax rates that are similar to those shown in Figures 1
and 2. Otherwise, marginal rates rarely exceed 50 percent, and average
rates rarely exceed 40 percent for two-parent families.
The tax rates presented in the top panel of Figure 2 are lowerin
We have made similar graphs for families in Illinois, a medium benefit state, that are
available on request. For the median single-parent family the figures show patterns similar



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs29
some cases significantly lowerthanthose described in Keane and
Moffitt's (1991) Table B-i 36 Their 20-hour average rates, for example, are
95 percent in Texas, 112 percent in Ohio (a medium-benefit state), and
124 percent in California (a high-benefit state). Several factors make our
estimated rates lower. The EITC was considerably more generous in
1990 than it was in i984, the year of their calculations. The wage rate for
the representative family in the Keane and Moffitt simulations is lower
than the wage rates received by our families, which means AFDC bene-
fits tend to be clawed back over a longer hours interval leading to higher
average rates. Keane and Moffitt also assume allfamilies receive housing
benefits, which we do not model. Benefit reductions associated with
housing increase cumulative rates by 4 to 33 percentage points in their
calculations, depending on the state.37 Finally, Keane and Moffitt in-
clude a fixed cost of working that adds 20 percentage points to all fami-
lies' tax rates. We have no way of assessing the size of work-related
expenses, but their existence means our calculationsunderestimate the
change in net disposable income that would result from working. Two
modeling differences make our rates higher than Keane and Moffitt's.
We incorporate state taxes and treat the combined employer and em-
ployee share of payroll taxes as falling completely on workers. (Keane
and Moffitt include only the employee share.)
3.4 Labor Force Participation and Hours of Work
Labor force participation rates in our sample vary from 56.4 percent
among single parents to 91.6 percent for primary wage earnersin two-
parent families. In two-parent families in our sample, 61.0 percentof
spouses work outside the home. In Section 4 weexamine factors corre-
lated with labor market and transfer program participation.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the usual hours worked per week
for single-parent families, primary earners in two-parent families, and
secondary earners in two-parent families. Part-time work is uncommon
Table B-i in Keane and Moffitt (199i) shows implicit and explicit tax rates faced by
representative single-parent families; if one assumes wages are $5.20 an hour, nonlabor
income is $4 per month, child care expenses are zero, and all families participate in pro-
grams for which they are eligible. In contrast, we use datafor each family in our sample to
make our calculations. We calculate tax rates for all families in the data using their reported
characteristics and present rates applying to the median and 90th-percentile families in a
low- and high-benefit state.
Housing benefits are clearly important for those who receive them; however, housing
programs are not operated as entitlements (i.e., not everyone who meetseligibility criteria
is entitled to benefits), and only around 30 percent of eligible families receive housing
benefits (see, e.g., Casey, 1992). Thus, the Keane and Moffitt convention for housing














































































































































































































































































































































































0The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs31
for families in our sample. Among single parents who work in the paid
labor market, 76.1 percent work 35 or more hours in the typical week.
Similarly, of the secondary earners in two-parent families who work in
the paid labor market, 74.5 percent work 35 or more hours in the typical
week. Part-time work is even less common for employed primary earn-
ers, 92.6 percent of whom work 35 or more hours a week. As isalso clear
from the figures, hours in part-time jobs are distributed fairly uniformly
between 20 and 35 hours.
Our data showing few families working part-time are consistent with
other data. Commonly cited explanations for the paucity of part-time jobs
focus on fixed labor-hiring costs to the employer. Because of these fixed
costs, empirical models that treat the wage rate as being exogenous gener-
ally overpredict the number of people working part-time. One approach
to addressing this problem is to model wages as increasing with hours of
work (Moffitt, 1984; Rosen, 1976) or to model some process of rationing
part-time jobs (Dickens and Lundberg, 1993). As a practical matter, the
empirical distribution of hours leads us to follow most others in the litera-
ture (Moffitt, 1984; Fraker and Moffitt, 1988; Keane and Moffitt, 1991;
Moffitt and Wolfe, 1992; Hoynes, 1993) who treat families as having three
choices in the number of hours they can work: 0, 20, and 40. Thus, in our
empirical work, the taxes and benefits families pay and receive generally
will be based on the difference between working 0 and 20 hours.
4. THE EFFECTS OF WAGES, TAXES, AND
TRANSFERS ON LABOR MARKET AND PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION
The literature on taxes and labor supply focuses primarily on the inten-
sive marginthe effect of taxes on hours of work for those in the labor
market. In Table 2 we showed that estimates from this literature imply
that the 1993 EITC expansion, when fully phased in, will have a modest
negative overall effect on the hours of work among families already
working, relative to the EITC in 1993. The negative effect occurs because
nearly 80 percent of working families that receive the credit are in its fiat
or phaseout range, where the incentives are toreduce hours. The EITC is
expected to have a beneficial effect on the extensive marginthe deci-
sion to work for those not in the labor market. Existing studies of the
EITC's effect on labor market behavior ignore labor market participation.
The broader literature on the effects of taxes and transfers on labor
market behavior also provides little guidance for understanding the
EITC's likely effects on labor market participation.32Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
In this section we examine the responsiveness of labor market and
transfer program participation to changes in after-tax wages, controlling
for transfer benefits, demographic characteristics, and other factors
likely to affect labor market and transfer program participation.
4.1 Empirical Model
To study the effect of wages, taxes, and program benefits on labor market
and program participation, we follow Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) and esti-
mate bivariate probit models of labor market and transfer program partici-
pation.38 We include variables for incomes, transfers, and demographic
characteristics in both participation equations. The models are estimated
separately for one-parent families and primary earners in two-parent fami-
lies. We also estimate a single-equation probit model for the labor market
participation decisions of secondary earners in two-parent families.
Income, tax rates, and benefits depend on labor market and transfer
program participation decisions, which leads to a potential endogeneity
problem with these policy variables. To circumvent this problem we
simulate families' taxes and benefits if they work 0 hours and if they
work 20 hours at their market wage rates. Explicit tax rates are then
defined as one minus the change in after-tax income divided by gross
earnings.
The main effect of the EITC on participation will be through its influ-
ence on net wages. We include net wages in the empirical model, de-
fined as gross wages (predicted wages for those not in the labor market)
multiplied by one minus the explicit tax rate. We expect that net wages
are positively correlated with labor market participation and negatively
correlated with transfer program participation. In sensitivity analyses
we examine the robustness of our results to (1) using the tax rate that
would arise from moving from 0 to 40 hours of work, and (2) using
predicted wages for all observations in the sample rather than for only
those people not in the labor force.
We examine the effects of program benefits by including the AFDC
and food stamp benefits available to a family if members work 0 hours.
We expect benefit guarantees to show a negative relationship to labor
market participation and a positive relationship to program participa-
To make inferences about behavioral effects from cross-state variation in benefit and tax
rules, it is important that households do not make location decisions based on these
benefits and taxes. If households with unobserved "tastes" for work systematically locate
in low-benefit, low-tax states, we would observe a spurious negative correlation between
taxes and benefits on one hand and hours (or labor market participation) on the other. In a
careful study using the 1980 Census, Walker (1994) finds little evidence of welfare-induced
migration.The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs33
tion. We include family income at 0 hours of work, which is primarily
capital income. Income at 0 hours is expected to have a negative effect on
both labor market and transfer program participation.
We also include a number of other variables that are common to stud-
ies of labor market and transfer program participation. Age and age
squared are included to capture life-cycle effects that might affect labor
market or program participation. We include years of education, family
size, and dummy variables for nonwhite, female, a self-reported mea-
sure of being in poor or fair health, presence ofchildren under 6 years
old, presence of children aged 6-12, and region of the country. The
dependent variable in the labor force participation model takes the value
1 if the person is usually employed during the sample month. The depen-
dent variable in the transfer program model takes the value 1 if the
family reports participating in either the AFDC or the food stamps pro-
gram during the sample month.
4.2 Empirical Results
Empirical results for our primary specifications are given in Table 4. The
primary variable of interest for this study is the effect of the net wage
rate on labor market and program participation. Forsingle parents (the
first two columns of Table 4), we find that net wages positively affect
labor market participation and negatively affect transfer program partici-
pation. Both coefficients are significant at typical levels of confidence. As
shown in the following section, where we summarize the results
through policy simulations, the economic significance of both estimates
is fairly large. In particular, a 10-percent increase in the after-tax wage (a
$0.61 increase) raises the single parent's probability of working by two
percentage points and lowers the probability of transfer program partici-
pation by more than four percentage points, holding other variables in
Table 3 at their means (and dummy variables at 0, except for female). Net
wage takes the expected signs in thespecifications for two-parent fami-
lies, but it is not significant in the labor market decisions of primary
earners. It is strongly significant in thetransfer program participation
regressions where a 10-percent increase in the net wage implies a reduc-
tion of 0.7 percentage points in the probability of participating (recall
that relatively few two-parent families receive transfers). These results
imply that policies, like the EITC, that alter the after-tax wage rate can
substantially increase labor market participation and reduce transfer pro-
gram participation.
The regression evidence showing strong effects of net wages is not an
artifact of our particular empirical specification, but it clearly emerges in










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)36Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
the top panel of Figure 4, we classify one-parent families by theirpre-
dicted wage rate and then plot their probability of working. Within each
wage group, we allocate families based on their quartile of the cumula-
tive tax rate distribution when increasing hours from 0 to 20. Ifone
looks across wage groups, it appears that the probability of working
generally rises with wage rates, though the relationship isnot mono-
tonic. Within wage groups, the probability of working falls sharply with
our exogenous measure of tax rates. Even after crudely controlling for
human capital by looking within predicted wage categories,tax rates
appear to exert a strong negative effect on the probability of labor force
participation.
The labor force participation rate of primaryearners in two-parent
families is very high. In the bottom panel of Figure 4, therefore,we
graph the effects of wages and taxes on the labor force participation of
secondary earners in two-parent families. As with singleparents, the
probability of working generally increases with predictedwage rates.
There is a weaker negative relationship between taxrates and labor
market participation for secondary earners than there is for singlepar-
ents. This result is somewhat surprising given that the literaturesug-
gests two-parent families are more responsive to economic variables
than are single-parent families. However, the figures donot take into
account many factors that are likely to affect labor market behavior.
The AFDC benefit guarantee appears to exert an economical andstatis-
tically significant effect in our regression specification of labormarket
and transfer program participation decisions. The influenceof the AFDC
variable presumably arises both from its size and from its influenceon
the benefit reduction rate. As is clear whenone examines tax rates in
Texas (a low-benefit state) and New York (a high-benefit state), thereis a
close positive relationship between the guarantee and thebenefit reduc-
tion rate. The empirical estimates showa consistent negative relation-
ship between the AFDC benefit guarantee and labor forceparticipation,
and a consistent positive relationship between theguarantee and pro-
gram participation. For single-parent families, a 10-percent increase in
the benefit guarantee implies a l.65-percentage-point reductionin the
probability of working and a l.45-percentage-point increasein the proba-
bility of receiving program benefits. The economicsignificance of the
effects is much smaller for two-parent families. As withwage rates, the
estimated effects of benefits from the empirical modelare also clearly
present when we graph program or labor force participationagainst
benefits, holding wages constant. (The figure is not shown.)
Several other coefficients generally have consistentpatterns across
family types and are economically and statistically significantinfluencesThe Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs37
One Parent Families
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FIGURE 4.Labor Force Participation by Wages and Tax Rates.
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038Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
on labor force and transfer program participation. The coefficient on net
private income at 0 hours is negatively related to labor market and trans-
fer program participation for single parents, but it is statistically signifi-
cant only in the labor market participation equations. The economic
significance of the other income variable is small. A 10-percent increase
in other income, for example, reduces the probability of work by 0.13
percentage point for secondary earners in two-parent families. Labor
force participation is generally negatively correlated with being female,
in poor or fair health, and with the number of children in the family
under six years of age, while these characteristics are positively cone-
lated with transfer program participation (conditioning on other charac-
teristics). Being in poor or fair health has an economically large effect,
lowering the probability of working by 23 percentage points for single
parents and 21 percentage points for secondary earners. It raises the
probability of participation in transfer programs by 22 percentage points
for single parents holding other variables at their means (and other
dummy variables at 0 except for female). Whites, more highly educated
persons, and individuals living in the South and West tend to have
higher labor force participation rates and have lower rates of transfer
program participation than others.
In the bivariate probit model for single-parent families, we estimate a
highly significant negative correlation between the labor market and
transfer program participation equations. The negative correlation im-
plies that unobserved factors, such as parental background variables,
that affect the probability of working are negatively correlated with the
probability of participating in transfer programs. The correlation of the
error terms in the two-parent primary earner specification is also nega-
tive but is much smaller and not significantly different from zero.
4.3 Alternative Specifications
In all the specifications reported in Table 4, we use the observed market
wage rate for people in the labor force. A common alternative is to use
predicted wages for all people in the sample (Blank, 1985; Hoynes, 1993).
Using the predicted rather than observed wage nearly doubles the esti-
mated effect of net wages on labor market participation for one-parent
families, and the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 5-
percent level. The wage effect more than doubles for secondary earners
in two-parent families, and it is also significant at usual levels of confi-
dence. The wage effect flips sign for primary earners, but the coefficient
is imprecisely estimated. We conclude that using predicted wages would
make the effects of the EITC on labor market participation considerably
larger than those based on estimates from Table 4.The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs39
The net wage effect is again larger when we calculate the exogenous
tax rate measures assuming people increase hours to 40 from 0, in this
case by roughly 35 percent. The 40-hour tax rates are higher than the 20-
hour rates for 60 percent of the sample, who generally live in high-
benefit states. It is not clear which measure of tax burdens is preferable,
but, like our treatment of wages, the net wage effects in Table 3 are lower
than they would be in alternative, plausible specifications.
We also estimated the bivariate probit equations including benefit
reduction rates in the specification, along with all other covariates. The
benefit reduction rates are defined as the ratio of changes in AFDC or
food stamps benefits to the change in earnings between 0 and 20 hours
of work. Since families living in high-benefit states have more AFDC at 0
hours and, thus, a longer clawback range, our definition of benefit reduc-
tion rates is highly correlated with the benefit at 0 hours of work. The
addition of the benefit reduction rate causes the coefficient on AFDC
benefits at 0 hours to flip signs and lose significance. In this case, the net
wage effects are lower than those in Table 4 for single parents but higher
for both principal and secondary earners in two-parent families. We
have little confidence that this specification adequately disentangles the
independent effects of benefit guarantees and benefit reduction rates.
The labor market effects of the EITC depend on changes at the intensive
and extensive margin. When we estimate hours equations like equation
(1), adjusting for selection, we get small wage and income elasticities,
though the parameters are estimated imprecisely. Our hours estimates
are similar to others in the existing literature, which suggests that our data
are consistent with data used in other studies of labor market behavior.
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To help interpret the economic significance of the coefficient estimates,
we use our regression results and labor market simulations to estimate
the effects of the OBRA93 EITC expansion on labor force participation.
As with Table 2, we simulate the effect of the 1996 EITC, when the
increase is fully phased in, relative to the law that applied in 1993. We
first model the effect of the expanded EITC on net-of-tax wages and
calculate the implied change in the probability that individuals work. For
people not in the labor force, we calculate the effect of the EITC on their
after-tax and after-transfer wage in both 1993 and 1996, assuming that if
they enter the labor force, they would work 20 hours per week.39
As with our earlier simulations, we calculate the changes in net wages and virtual
incomes that arise from the EITC for secondary wage earners, holding the hours of the
primary earner fixed at their observed value.40Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
The simulations show that the EITC increases the net wage of single
parents by 15 percent. The higher net wage increases their probability of
working by 3.3 percentage points.40 If each of these single parents works
an average of 20 hours per week for 20 weeks per year, our simulation
implies that the hours of single-parent families would increase by
roughly 72.8 million hours per year. The EITC expansion increases the
mean net-of-tax wage of primary earners in two-parent families by 19.6
percent. This leads to a much smaller 0.7-percentage-point increase in
labor force participation because most primary earners in two-parent
families are already working. Our simulation implies that primary wage
earners entering the labor force because of the EITC expansion will work
about 12.1 million hours, again at an average of 20 hours per week for 20
weeks per year.
A feature of the EITC that has received little attention is that the
average net wage of secondary wage earners decreases by 5.0 percent
because the earnings of the second worker frequently either moves the
family into the clawback range of the credit or makes the family ineligi-
ble for the EITC. Therefore, we expect secondary workers to reduce their
hours of work by roughly 10.4 million because of their lower mean net
wages. Overall, our simulation results imply that greater labor market
participation will lead to an increase of 74.4 million hours, given our
assumptions that new labor market participants will work 400 hours per
year.
The increased hours resulting from higher rates of labor force participa-
tion can be compared with the reduction in hours caused by the credit
shown in Table 2. We use Triest's (1990) labor supply parameters for the
simulation. As is evident from Table 2, most EITC recipients in our
sample are concentrated in the flat and clawback ranges of the credit and
their reduction in hours is larger than the increase for those in the
subsidy range. The results from Table 2 imply that single parents will
reduce their hours of work by 26.4 million, primary earners in two-
parent families by 13.6 million, and secondary earners by 14.5 million.
Together, the simulations suggest that the aggregate reduction in
hours supplied by working households, 54.5 million, would be more
than offset by the hours of new entrants, 74.4 million, if new labor force
participants work an average of 20 hours per week for 20 weeks per year.
If new labor market entrants work less, the "participation effect" will be
smaller. If they work more, the participation effect will be larger. If
° We have not explicitly modeled Medicaid. Over time, a new labor force participant
could, depending on income and family characteristics, lose Medicaid benefits, which
presumably will inhibit labor market participation. Further work examining the degree to
which incorporating Medicaid would alter our results would be worthwhile.estimates of participation elasticities with respect to wages from the
alternative specifications described in Section 4.3 were used, our esti-
mated offset would also be somewhat higher. For example, using im-
puted wages for all persons implies that new labor market participants
will increase hours of work by 108.4 million. Replacing the 20-hour aver-
age tax rate with the tax rate from 0 to 40 hours implies that the new
workers will work 91.8 million hours.
We also use our empirical model to simulate the effects of the 1993
EITC expansion on participation in transfer programs. The results are
summarized in the lower panel of Table 5. The 15-percent increase in
net-of-tax wages for single parents implies that transfer program partici-
pation among this group will decrease by 7.2 percentage points or that
almost 400,000 families will no longer participate either in AFDC or in
the food stamps program. The increased net wages of primary wage
TABLE 5.
Labor Market and Transfer Program Effects of the OBRA93 EITC
Expansion, 1993 to 1996
The Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs41
Labor market effects




The estimation of the change in hours from new labor force participation assumes that, on average, these
persons work 20 hours per week for 20 weeks per year.
The reductions in hours for workers are simulated using the kinked budget set approach described in
Section 2.1 and in Table 2. We use the estimated net wage and virtual income elasticities from Triest
(1990).
Single parents 15.0 72.8 26.4 10.1
Primary wage earners 19.6 12.1 13.6 7.7
Secondary wage earners5.0 10.4 14.5 30.3
Total 74.4 54.5 11.2
New labor force
participants Families in the labor market
Annual hours
change due toAnnual hours
Percent labor forcereductions ofAverage annual
change inparticipation workers reduction
net wage (million)a (millionY' in hours
Single-parent families 398,384 $6,844 $2,040
Two-parent families 117,757 $4,702 $2,84242Dickert, Houser, & Scholz
earners imply a reduction in transfer program participation of roughly
117,000 families. The mean annual benefits (in 1994 dollars) for single-
parent families are $6,844 and $4,702 for two-parent families, and the
mean EITC payments for these family types are $2,040 and $2,842, re-
spectively. Therefore, our simulations imply that a potentially substan-
tial savings in transfer payments could result from the EITC expansion.
6. CONCLUSION
Over the past 20 years the EITC has been a favored policy tool for assisting
low-income families with children. Between 1978 and 1996 the maximum
credit available to families with children will have increased nearly 800
percent in nominal dollars. No other major program directed toward low-
income families has grown at a comparable rate. The EITC is now the
cornerstone of the Clinton administration's welfare reform agenda.
The effectiveness of the EITC will depend, in part, on its effect on
labor market behavior. Most workers that will receive the credit have
incomes in the flat or phaseout range of the credit, where the credit
provides an unambiguous incentive for people to work fewer hours.
Using recent estimates from the empirical literature on taxes and labor
supply, we find that the change in incentives caused by the 1993 expan-
sion of the credit is expected to lead to a modest reduction in hours of
work by those in the phaseout range of the credit. When evaluated over
all workers that could receive the credit, our central estimate predicts an
overall reduction of 0.54 percent in hours of work.
No EITC labor market study examines the effect of the credit on labor
market participation, though it is through this dimension"making
work pay"that the EITC appears to attract its favored status. The effect
of the credit on labor market participation may be large. As Heckman
(1993, p. 118) writes, "A major lesson of the past 20 years is that the
strongest empirical effects of wages and nonlabor income on labor sup-
ply are to be found at the extensive marginthe margin of entry and
exitwhere the elasticities are definitely not zero."
Before estimating participation rates, one needs to characterize the tax
environment families face. If the cumulative tax burdens faced by the
poor are very high, even the 40-percent wage subsidy that the EITC will
offer to low-income taxpayers with two or more children may not be
enough to make work an economically attractive option relative to wel-
fare. We use a detailed microsimulation model to characterize the tax
rates associated with labor market decisions for each family in our sam-
ple. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
we calculate tax rates faced by low-income families. We show that bothThe Earned Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs43
marginal and average tax rates can be very high (over 90 percent) for
high-tax households in both high- and low-benefit states. At the same
time, because of earnings disregards and other features of the tax trans-
fer system, tax rates on families in both high- and low-benefit states are
often considerably lower than this high-tax case.
We find, both in descriptive and empirical models, that the after-tax
wage has an economically and statistically positive effect on labor market
participation and a negative effect on transfer program participation.
Our results imply that when fully phased in, the 1993 EITC expansion
will increase labor force participation rates by 3.3 percentage points for
single parents in our sample, increase participation of primary earners in
two-parent families by 0.7 percentage point, and decrease participation
of secondary earners in two-parent families. When we simulate the over-
all effect on hours, assuming new participants work 20 hours per week
for 20 weeks, the increase in labor force participation more than offsets
the adverse effects of the EITC on hours supplied by low-income indi-
viduals. If new labor market participants work fewer total hours, the
beneficial labor market effects of the credit will be smaller. Regardless of
the precise estimates that are favored, it is clear that the participation
effects of the credit can substantially offset, in aggregate, the negative
effect of the credit on the labor supplied by people already in the labor
market. Future work on the effect of the EITC on labor supply should
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